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RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Supreme Court of the United States.
INHABITANTS OF THE TOWNSHIP OF BERNARDS
V.
MORRISON ET AL.
i. As against bonafide holders of municipal bonds, which recite that
they are issued in pursuance of a certain Act of the legislature which
authorizes certain commissioners to borrow money on the faith and credit
of the town, and execute bonds thereof, after a majority of the tax-payers
had assented thereto, which fact should be proved by the affidavit of the
town assessor, the defenses that the consent of a majority of the tax-
payers was not given; that the affidavit of the assessor to that effect was
not true; and that the commissioners did not borrow money on the bonds,
but disposed of them without lawful consideration, are not availing. -
2. The fact that the commissioners were special officers appointed for
the purpose of issuing the bonds, by the Court, under the Act of the legis-
lature, does not make their acts any less binding on the town. It is suffi-
cient that full control was given them in the matter.
In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the
District of New Jersey.
. A. A. Clark and James R. Englisk, for plaintiff in error.
Courtlandt Parker, for defendants in error.
BREWER, J., March 3, 1890. This is an action on township
bonds. Judgment was rendered against the township, and it
alleges error. The bonds were issued under an Act approved
April 9 th, 1868, and found in the Sessions Laws of New
Jersey for that year (page 915 et seq.). Outside of the obli-
gatory words, this was the form of the bond:
"This bond is one of a series of like tenor, amounting in the whole to
the sum of one hundred and twenty-seven thousand dollars, issued on the
faith and credit of said Township in pursuance of an Act entitled "An
Act to authorize certain towns in the counties of Somerset, Morris, ]Essex,,
and Union to issue bonds and take stock in the Passaic Valley and Peapack
Railroad Company," approved April 9, i86S. In testimony whereof, the
undersigned, Commissioners of the said township of Bernards, in the
County of Somerset, to carry into effect the purposes and provisions of the
said Act, duly appointed, commissioned, and sworn, have hereunto set
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our hands and seals the ist day of January, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-nine.
JoHrN H. ANDERSON, (L. S.)
JO]N GUERIN, (L. S.)
O1rIV R R. Srz rL, (L. S.)
Commissioners.
Registered in the County Clerk's office.
WIrriAli Ross, JR.,
County Clerk."
The first section of the Act provides that, upon the applica-
tion in writing of twelve or more resident freeholders, the
Circuit Court of the county shall appoint three resident free-
holders to be Commissioners. Section two reads as follows:
That it shall be lawful for said Commissioners to borrow, on the faith
and credit of their respective townships, such sums of money, not exceed-
ing ten per centum of the valuation of the real estate and landed property
of such township, to be ascertained by the assessment rolls thereof, res-
pectively, for the year eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, for a term not
exceeding twenty-five years, at a rate of interest not exceeding seven per
centum per annum, payable semi-annually, and to execute bonds therefor
under their hands and seals respectively; the bonds so to be executed
may be in such sums, and payable at such times and places, as the said
Commissioners and their successors may deem expedient; but no such
debt shall be contracted or bonds issued by said Commissioners, of or for
either of said townships, until the written consent shall have been obtained
of the majority of the tax-payers of such township, or their legal repre-
sentatives, appearing upon the last assessment roll, as shall represent a
majority of the landed property of such township (including lands owned
by non-residents) appearing upon the last assessment roll of such town-
ship; such consent shall state the amount of money authorized to be
raised in such township, and that the same is to be invested in the stock
of the said railroad company, and the signatures shall be proved by one
or more of the Commissioners. The fact that the persons signing such
consent are a majority of the tax-payers of such township, and represent
a majority of the real property of such township, shall be proved by the
affidavit of the assessor of such township endorsed upon, or annexed to
such written consent, and the assessor of such township is hereby required
to perform such service. Such consent and affidavit shall be filed in the
office of the clerk of the county in which such township is situated, and a
certified copy thereof in the town-clerk's office of such township, and the
same, or a certified copy thereof, shall be evidence of the facts therein
contained, and received as evidence in any court of this State, and before
any judge or justice thereof.
By Section three these Commissioners were authorized to
dispose of the bonds, and invest the money in railroad stock
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in the name of the township, to subscribe for and purchase
stock in the railroad company, and to act at stockholders'
meetings. Section fourteen provides-
That all bonds issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act
shall be registered in the office of the county clerk of the county in which
the township is situated issuing the same, and the words "Registered in
the County Clerk's office " shall be printed or written across the face of
each bond, attested by the signature of the county clerk when so regis-
tered, and no bond shall be valid unless so registered.
It is conceded that the Commissioners were duly appointed;
that the issue of bonds was not in excess of the amount
authorized by the statute; that a paper purporting to contain
the consent of the requisite number of tax-payers, duly verified
by the affidavit of the township assessor, was filed in the office
of the clerk of the county; and that the plaintiffs were bona
fide holders. But the contention is, that the consent roll did
not in fact contain the requisite number of tax-payers, and
that the affidavit of the assessor was not true; also that the
Commissioners did not borrow any money on the bonds, but dis-
posed of them without lawful consideration. The Circuit
Court held, that these defenses were unavailing against bona
fide holders of the bonds; and with that ruling we concur.
Indeed, all the questions which were earnestly presented and
argued by counsel for plaintiffs in error have been often con-
sidered and decided by this Court. The Act gave the Com-
missioners power, under certain conditions, to issue the bonds.
The recitals therein show that they were issued in pursuance
of the Act, and the bonds were all duly registered as required.
The case of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell (1883), 107 U. S.
147, 158, was a suit on bonds in form like the ones in suit,
and issued under a statute practically identical. The validity
of those bonds was sustained; and in the course of his
opinion, speaking for the Court, Mr. JUSTICE HARLAN says-
Legislative authority for an issue of bonds being established by refer-
ence to the statute, and the bonds reciting that they were issued in pur-
suance of the statute, the utmost which plaintiff was bound to show, to
entitle him, pirima face, to judgment, was the due appointment of the
commissioners, and the execution by them in fact, of the bonds. It was
not necessary that he should, in the first instance, prove either, that he
paid value, or that the conditions preliminary to the exercise by the corn-
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missioners of the authority conferred by statute were, in fact, performed
before the bonds were issued. The one was presumed from the possession
of the bonds; and the other was established by the statute authorizing
an issue of bonds, and by proof of the due appointment of the commis-
sioners, and their execution of the bonds, with recitals of compliance
with the statute.
See, also, the cases of Bernards Twp. v. Stebbins (1883),
109 U. S. 341, and New Providence v. Halsey (I886), 117 Id.
336, in which bonds, issued either under the Act before us, or
that referred to in 107 U. S. (snpra), were considered by the
Court. Reference also may be made to two New Jersey
cases, Cotton v. New Providence (1885), 47 N.J. Law, 4oI;Illntual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Elizabetlh (1880), 42 Id. 235. It were
useless to refer to the long list of cases in which recitals like
these have been held sufficient to sustain bonds in the hands
of bona fide holders. It is urged that these commissioners
were not elected by the people; that they were not the gen-
eral officers of the township, but were special officers ap-
pointed by the Circuit Court, special agents as it were, for
the specific purpose; that the statute does not in terms give
them authority to determine whether the preliminary condi-
tions have been complied with; and that this case is theref6re
to be distinguished in these respects from those cases where
similar recitals have been held conclusive. But though not
the ordinary officers of the township, they were the ones to
whom by legislative direction was given full authority in the
matter of issuing bonds. The organization of townships, the
number, character, and duties of their various officers, are
matters of legislative control; and it is not doubtful that
officers appointed represent the municipality as fully as officers
elected. When the legislature has declared how an officer is to
be selected, and the officer is selected in accordance with that
declaration, his acts, within the scope of the powers given
him by the legislature, bind the municipality. But these
special commissioners were not the only officers of the town-
ship whose acts gave currency to these bonds. If inquiry
bad been directed to the county and township records, the
affidavit of the township assessor to the consent required
would have been found; and on the face of the bonds it ap-
pears that the county clerk of the county has added his
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official certificate to their validity, so that the acts of general,
as well as of special, officers and agents of the township, are the
foundation upon which rests the validity of these bonds.
While it is true that the Act does not in terms say that these
commissioners are to decide that all preliminary conditions
have been complied with, yet such express direction and au-
thority is seldom found in acts providing for the issuing of
bonds. It is enough that full control in the matter is given
to the officers named. In the case of Oregon v. Jennings,
(1886), 119 U. S. 74, 92, the rule is thus stated by Mr.
JUSTICE BLATCHFORD-
Within the numerous decisions by this Court, on the subject, the super-
visor and the town-clerk, they being named in the statute as the officers,
to sign the bonds, and the corporate authorities to act for the town in issu-
ing them to the company, were the persons intrusted with the duty of de-
ciding, before issuing the bonds, whether the conditions determined at the
election existed. If they have certified to that effect in the bonds, the
town is estoppedfrom asserting, as against a bona fide holder, that the con-
ditions prescribed by the popular vote were not complied with.
Whatever may be the hardships of this particular case, to
sustain the defenses pressed would go far towards destroying
the market value of municipal securities. We see no error
in the ruling of the Circuit Court, and its judgment is there-
fore affirmed.
FIELD, J., took no part in the decision of this case.
The cases collected in the follow-
ing note are confined to the decis-
ions of the United States Supreme
Court, and relate only to the rights
of bona fide holders of municipal
bonds. It is a matter of common
knowledge that the Supreme Court
has always been exceedingly watch-
ful of the interests of the innocent
holder of municipal bonds, as con-
trasted with the State "Courts who
seem morefavorably inclined toward
the municipality. Yet it will be
observed that the Federal courts, by
reason of the multiplicity of cases,
or perhaps from a gradual change of
view, are less liberal to the investor
in this class of securities, than for-
merly, and the earlier are more
frequently, and more carefully dis-
tinguished from those of later date.
Who are bonafide holders ?
One who purchases bonds in open
market, supposing them to be valid,
and having no notice to the contrary,
will be deemed a bona fide holder:
Galveston, Hiouslon and Hender-
son R. R. Co. v. Cowdrey (1871),
ii Wall. (78 U. S) 459.
A holder of bonds of the City of
Ottawa, knowing that they were
issued to aid a manufacturing com-
pany in the development of the
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water power of the City which -was
not a corporate purpose within the
meaning of the Constitution of
Illinois, is not a bona fide holder,
and the bonds as to him are void:
City of Ottawa v. Carey (1883), io8
U. S. "i0.
Irregularities or defects that do not
prejudice the rights of bona fide
holders.
In general, when the bonds on
their face importa compliance -with
the law under which they are issu-
ed, the purchaser is not bound to
look further for evidence of a com-
pliance -with the conditions of the
grant of power.
Knox Countyv. Aspinwall et. al.
(1859), 21 How.(62 U. S-) 539, is the
leading case. In that case it was
held, that the failure of the sheriff
to give notice of an election held
for the purpose of determining upon
the issue of bonds, could not pre-
judice the rights of a bona fide
holder for value. The opinion of
NErSON, J., rests upon the Eng-
lish case of " The Royal Britsh
Bank v. Turquand (1856), 6 Ellis &
B1. 327." This -wasan action upon
a bond against the defendant as
manager of a joint stock company.
The defense was want of power un-
der the deed ofsettlementor charter
to give the bond. One of the clauses
in the charter provided that the
directors might borrow money on
bonds in such sums as they should,
from time to time, by a general
resolution of the company, be
authorized to borrow. The resolu-
tion passed was considered defective.
Jurvls, C. B., in delivering the
judgment of the court, observed
"We may now take it for granted
that the dealings with these com-
panies are not like dealing with
other partnerships, and that the
parties dealing with them are
bound to read the statute and the
deed of settlement. But they are
not bound to do more. And the
party here, on reading the deed of
settlement, would find, not a prohi-
bition from borrowing, but a per-
mission to do so, on certain condi-
tions. Finding that the authority
might be made complete by a reso-
lution, he would have a right to in-
fer the fact of a resolution authoriz-
ing that which on the face of the
document, appeared to be legiti-
mately done."
Excess of issue over constitution-
al limitation of indebtedness.
In Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1864), i
Wall. (68 U. S.) 175, it is held that
the fact that the bonds were issued
in an amount exceeding the consti-
tutional limitation does not invalid-
ate them in the hands of. an inno-
cent holder.-So in a suit brought
by a bona fide holder fpr value to
recover the amount of certain cou-
pons of township bonds, it cannot
be shown, as adefence to a recovery,
that at the time of voting and issu-
ing the series of bonds, the value
of the taxable property of the town-
ship was not in amount sufficient
to authorize the voting and issuing
the whole series according to the
State act 'which authorized their
issue, -where there is a recital in the
bonds that the requirements of such
act have been complied with:
Miiarcy v. Oswego TwP. (1876), 92
U. S. 637, also IHumboldt Twp. v.
Long (1876),Id. 642 (MILIER,J., dis-
senting).
Irregularities in Election.
Where the County Court called
the election instead of the sheriff
as required by law, and all subse-
quent proceedings were regular,
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held, that this irregularity did not
invalidate bonds in the hands of
bona fide holders: 3farshall Co.
Board of Supervisors v. Schenck
(1867), 5 Wall. (72 U. S). 772.
Notice of defects.
Where the bonds of the munici-
pality had been issued pursuant to
a mandamus to a railroad company,
and subsequently the city obtained
an injunction and order of the Court
requiring the railroad company to
deposit the bonds with a receiver,
it was held, that, notwithstanding
the pendency of said actions and
the judgments and orders therein,
the prima facie presumption, that
the purchaser acquired the bonds
without notice of defects in the in-
ception of the instruments, was not
overcome: City of Lexington v.
Butler (1872), 14 Wall. (81 U. S.)
282.
A judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of New York in
an action by the State against the
town of Thompson, by which the
bonds of the town were declared
null and void, could not affect a
bona fide purchaser for value of
the bonds, who had no knowledge
of the action : Thompson v. Per-
rine (I88I), O3 U. S. 8o6.
Estopped by recitals.
In the case of Lynde v. Winne-
bago County (1873), 16 Wall. (83
U. S.) 6, the majority of the Court
(CHASE, TILLER and VIELD, JJ.,
dissenting), held that where the
County Judge was authorized by
popular vote to levy a tax for the
purpose of constructing a court
house, to be extended over a period
of not mdre than ten years, the
power to borrow money and issue
bonds therefor was implied; and
the requisite popular sanction be-
ing set forth upon their face, and
the judge being authorized to de-
cide whether such sanction had
been given, the county is estopped
from denying the validity of the
bonds in the hands of bona fide
holders.
When the bonds of the City of
Ottawa, contained recitals of the
titles of ordinances under which
they were issued which, in effect,
assured the purchaser that they
were for municipal purposes, with
a previous sanction of a majority
vote of the city; the city is es-
topped to say, as against a bonafide
holder of the bonds, that they were
not issued or used for a municipal
or corporate purpose: Hackett et al.,
Exr's. v. Ottawa (1879), 99 U. S. 86.
In aid of Railways.
An Act of the Legislature of Tex-
as provided that the City of Antonio
might take stock of the San Antonio
Railroad Company, and issue bonds
to pay for the same. The subscrip-
tion was made and bonds issued.
The railroad was not built. Held,
that the bonds were valid in the
hands of a bona fide purchaser:
City of San Antonio v. Mebaffy
(1878), 96 U. S. 312.
So in County of Daviess v.
Huidekoper (1879), 98 U. S. 113, it
was held that the bonds of a
county in Missouri are not void in
the hands of a bona fide purchasor
for value, because the railroad corn-
pany, to which the bonds were is-
sued in payment for its capital
stock, was not created according to
law, until subsequent to the favora-
ble vote of the qualified voters, and
the order of subscription.
Defects in Execution.
A town in Wisconsin issuing its
bonds, is estopped, as against a bona
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fide holder for value, to show that the
true date of the bonds was different
from that named in them, or that
the town clerk, who was in office at
the date of the bonds, in fact signed
the bonds after he went out of of-
fice: Wevauwega v. Ayling (1879),
99 U.S. 112.
County bonds issued in Missouri
by a de facto county court, and
sealed with the seal of the Court,
and signed by the de facto presi-
' dent, cannot be impeached in the
hands of an innocent holder, by
showing that the acting president
was not de jure one of the justices
of the Court: Ralls Co. v. Doug-
lass (1882), 105 U. S. 728.
Defects and Irregularities that
affect the rights of bona fide hold-
ers. Want offpower.
Where, by authority of an Act of
the Illinois Assembly providing that
it shall be lawful for the agent of any
corporate body "to subscribe to the
capital stock of a railroad compa-
ny," a County Supervisor subscrib-
ed forstock and issued certainbonds
to a railroad company,as agent of the
town, held, that the bonds were in-
valid, though in the hands of an
innocent holder, for want of au-
thority on the part of the municipal
corporation to issue: Township of
East Oakland v. Skinner (1877), 94
U. S. 255.
Where the charter of a Missouri
railroad company authorized the
taxable inhabitants of a "strip of
country" to vote a tax in aid of the
railroad company., and required the
county court to levy and collect
such tax, if voted, this gave no
authority to the county to issue
bonds, and bonds so issued are void
though in the hands of a bonafide
holder: Ogden v. County of Daviess
(i88r), 1o2 U. S. 634.
The City of Holly Springs sub-
scribed for stock of a railroad com-
pany, and issued its bonds subse-
quent to a special election and a
general ratification by the Legisla-
ture of previous subscriptions to
stock; though not in violation of
the Constitution, yet neither the
election nor subscription was au-
thorized by any Act of the Legisla-
ture, held, that the bonds were void
in the hands of a bonafide holder
for.want of power to issue, and in-
definiteness ofratifying Act: Hayes
v. Holly Spirings (1885), 114 U. S.
120.
Not estoped by recitals.
The Legislative journals of the
State of Illinois did not contain the
requisite evidence of the passage of
the law under which the bonds of
the town of South Ottawa were is-
sued, held, that in the action to
recover the amount due on the
bonds, the town "was not estopped
to deny the existence of the law
under which its bonds purport to
have been issued. The fact that
the holder was a bo;zaftde purchaser
does not affect their validity: South
Ottawa v. Perkins (1876), 94 U. S.
260; Buchanan v. Litchfield (I88O),
102 Id. 278.
Excess of constitutional limitation
of indebtedness.
In the case of Buchanan v. Litch-
fleld (supra), it was held, that, where
the City of Litchfield issued its
bonds to an amount in excess of the
constitutional limitation of muni-
cipal indebtedness, in the absence
of recitals in the bonds, represent-
ing on the part of the constituted
authorities, that the constitutional
requirements were met, the bonds
were void though in the hands of a
bonafide holder.
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The case of Dixon v. Field (1884),
Iii U. S. 83, goes a step further.
It held that bonds in the hands of
bona fide holders are void, when
issued to an amount in excess of
the constitutional limitation of in-
debtedness, even though the recitals
in the bonds are that they are con-
formable to law. In this case is cited
Buchanan v. Lilclfield (sitpra),
and Northern National Bank v.
Porler (1884), iio U. S. 6o8. The
point is made that the municipality
will be estopped to deny the validity
of bonds issued by it, only when the
officers are authorized to ascertain
and determine the existence of the
facts upon which the recitals as to
their validity are based: (Contra)
Dallas Co. v. .17cKenzie (1884), 11O
U. S. 686.
When a county court issued the
bonds of a county to an amount in
excess of the amount fixed by the
commissioners, and approved by
the majority vote of the electors of
the county, the bonds, to the extent
of th&" excess, are invalid in the
hands of an innocent holder, though
the bonds contained a recital that
they were issued according to law
and the ordinance of the Court:
County- of Daviess v. Dickinson
(1886); 117 U. S. 657.
Unconstitutionality.
Bonds in the hands of a bona
fide holder, issued by authority of
an Act of the Legislature of Vest
Virginia, authorizing the City of
Parkersburg to loan the bonds to
persons engaged in manufactur-
ing, are void, by reason of the un-
constitutionality of the Act: City
of Parkersburg v. Brown et al.
(1883), xo6 U. S. 487.
A curative statute enacted by a
Legislature having no constitution-
alauthorityto grant the new power,
except on a two-thirds vote of the
city, will not make good the bonds
of the city in the hands of a bona
fide holder, if such vote has not
been obtained: Katzenberger v.
City of 4berdeen (1887), 1-2 U. S.
172.
Defects in Execution.
When the law provides that a
statute authorizing the issue of
municipal bonds should nottake ef-
fect until after its publication in a-
certain paper, and further that no
bonds be issued under its authority
until the question of their issue
had been decided by popular vote
upon thirty days notice, a bond
which upon its face refers to the
act, and shows that the notice of
election was given before the act
went into effect, is void, even in the
hands of an innocent purchAser.
McClure v. Oxford Twf. (1877),
94 U. S. 429.
When an act of the General As-
sembly of Missouri, passed March
3oth 1872, provided that any bonds
thereafter issued should be regis-
tered with the State Auditor, held,
that bonds actually issued in Octo-
ber, 1872, but antedated as of March
28th 1872, and not registered with
the State Auditor, were invalid in
the hands of an innocent holder:
Anthonyv. Coun1tyof Jasper (x88o),
ioi U. S. 693.
Where an examination of the
records would have shown that the
bonds were not issued on the day
recited as their date, and that the
person who signed them was not
the Mayor at the time they were
signed, the facts that the records
would show that the person signing
them was Mayoron the day of their
date, and that the statutes and or-
dinances referred to in the bonds
authorized their issue, and that the
TOWNSHIP OF BERNARDS V. MORRISON.
indorsements showed they had been who executed them : Cole v. City
registered, v:ill not aid the put- of Cleburne (1889), 131 U. S. 162.
chaser, as even bona fide holders of
municipal bonds, must take the C. H. CHILDS.
risk of the official character of those Minneapolis, Minn.
MUNICIPAL, BONDS have also been the subject of leading articles and
annotations in THE A-1ERIcAN LAW REGISTER, wherein the subject has
been more generally treated, viz:-
RAILROAD Am BONDS in the Supreme Court of the United States, by
J'ames P. Mister, of Kansas City, Missouri; a leading article discussing
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri and their misconception
by the Supreme Court of the United States: vol. 17, page 209.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY POWERS IN BOND CASES IN THE
SUPR-EaE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, by the same author; a leading
article continuing the same subject, and discussing the doctrine of the
Supreme Court of the United States as unwarranted and subversive of the
law of powers applicable to cases of special agency, and as an unwar-
rantable application of the law of estoppel : vol. 17, page 6o9.
THE AUTHORITY AND STEPS TOWARDS THE ISSUANCE OF MUNICIPAL
BONDS, by Adelbert Hamilton, of Chicago; an annotation to the case of
Rouede v. The 1ayor ofJersey City (1884), in the U. S. Circ. Ct., N.
Dist. N. J., which was a case of a bona fide holder of such a bond: vol.
23, page 306.
ON MUNICIPAL SUBSCRIPTIONs TO THE STOCK OF RAILROAD COMIPAN-
mS; a leading article discussing, in 1853, the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Sharpless et al. v. The Mayor
(1852), 21 Pa. 147; S. C. 2 A REICAN LAW REIGISTER (0. S.) 27, 85,.
where the right of a municipality to subscribe for railroad bonds was sus-
tained: vol. 2, (0. S.) page I.
Vnf.. XXXVII.1-25
QUIMBY V. BOSTON & M. R. CO.
Supreme Judicial Court of Afassachuselts.
QUIMBY v. BOSTON & M. R. CO.
A railroad company is not liable for an injury sustained through the
negligence of its servants, by a person who is traveling on a free pass
containing an exemption from liability by injury from accident.
If such pass contemplates the placing upon it of the signature of the
user, this provision is designed to secure complete evidence of the user's
assent to its terms, and if he is allowed to travel without signing the pass,
the user cannot be allowed to deny his assent to the company's exemption.
Such exemption is not contrary to public policy and the contract is
-valid.
Report from the Superior Court of Essex County.
An action of tort by Asahel Quimby against the Boston &
Maine Railroad, for personal injuries sustained in a collision
upon its railroad.
H. P. 17foulton, for plaintiff.
S. Lincoln, for defendant.
DEVENS, J., January i, t89o. When the plaintiff received
his injury, he was traveling upon a free pass given him at his
own solicitation, and as a pure gratuity, upon which was ex-
pressed his agreement that, in consideration thereof, he
assumed all risk of accident which might happen to him while
traveling on, or getting off, the trains, of the defendant rail-
road corporation, on which the ticket might be honored for
passage. The ticket bore on its face the words, "provided he
signs the agreement on the back hereof." In fact, the agree-
ment was not signed by the plaintiff, he not having been'
required to do so by the conductor who honored it as good
for the passage, and who twice punched it. The fact that the
plaintiff had not signed, and was not required to sign, we do
not regard as important. Having accepted the pass, he
must have done so on the conditions fully expressed therein,
whether he actually read them or not: Squire v. Railroad Co.
(1867), 98 Mass. 239; Hillv Railway Co. (1887), i44 Id. 284;
Railroad Co. v. Chipmanz (1888), I46 Id. 107. The object of
the provision as to signing is to furnish complete evidence that
the person to whom the pass is issued assents thereto: but one
who actually avails himself of such a ticket, and of the priv-
ileges it confers, to secure a passage, cannot be allowed to
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deny that he made the agreement expressed therein, because
he did not, and was not required to sign it: Railway Co. v.
M7cGown(I886), 65 Tex. 643 ; Railroad Co. v. Read (1865), 37
Ill. 484; Wells v. Railway Co. (1862), 24 N. Y. i8 ; Perkins
v. Railway Co. (1862), Id. 196.
If this is held to be so, the case presents the singly inquiry
whether such a contract is invalid, which has not heretofore
been settled in this State, and upon which there has been great
contrariety of opinion in different courts. If the common
carrier accepts a person as a passenger, no such contract hav-
ing been made, such passenger may maintain an action for
negligence in transporting him, even if he be carried gratuit-
ously. Having admitted him to the rights of a passenger, the
carrier is not permitted to deny that he owes to him the duty
which, as carrying on a public employment, he owes to those
who have paid him for the service: Files v. Railroad Co. (1889),
149 Mass. 204; Toddv. Railroad Co. (i860, 3 Allen (Mass.) I8;
Com. v. Railroad Co. (870, io8 Mass. 7 ; Littleiohn v. Rail-
road Co. (1889), 148 Id. 478; Railroad Co. v. Derby (852),
14 How. (55 U. S.) 468 ; The New World v. Ring (1853), i6
Id. (57 U. S.) 469. But the question whether the carrier
may, as the condition upon which he grants to the passenger a
gratuitous passage, lawfully make an agreement with him by
which the passenger must bear the risks of transportation, ob-
viously differs from this.
In a large number of cases the English decisions, as well as
those of New York, have held that where a drover was per-
mitted to accompany animals upon what was called a "free
pass," issued upon 'the condition that the user should bear
all risks of transportation, he could not maintain an action for
an injury received by the riegligence of the carrier's servants.
A similar rule would without doubt be applied where a servant,
from the peculiar character of goods, as delicate machinery,
was permitted to accompany them, and in other cases of that
nature. That passes of this character are "free passes," prop-
erly so called, has been denied in other cases, as the carriage
of the drover is a part of the contract for the carriage of the
animals. The cases on this point were carefully examined
and criticised by Mr. Justice BRADLEY in Railroad Co. v. Lock-
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wood (1873), 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 367, and it is there held that,
such a pass is not gratuitous, as it is given as one of the
terms upon which the cattle are carried. The decision is put
upon the ground that the drover was a passenger carried for
hire, and that with such a passenger a contract of this nature
could not be made. The Court, at the conclusion of the opin-
ion, expressly waives the discussion of the question here
presented, and, as it states, purposely refrains from expressing
any opinion as to what would have been the result had it con-
sidered the plaintiff a free passenger instead of one for hire.
Railway Co. v. Stevens (1878), 95 U. S. 655, in which the same
distinguished judge delivered the opinion of the Court, is put
upon the ground that the transportation of the defendant, al-
though not paid for by him in money, was not a matter of
charity or gratuity in any sense, but was by virtue of an agree-
ment in which the mutual interest of the parties was consulted.
Whether the English or New York authorities rightly or
wrongly hold that one traveling upon a" drover's pass," as it is
sometimes called, is a free passenger, they show that in the
opinion of these courts, a contract can properly be made with a
free passenger that he shall bear the risks of transportation.
This is denied by many courts whose opinions are entitled to
weight. It will be observed that in the case at bar there is no
question of any willful or malicious injury, and that the plain-
tiff was injured by the carelessness of the defendant's servants.
The cases in which the passenger was strictly a free passen-
ger, accepting his ticket as a pure gratuity, and upon the
agreement that he would himself bear the cost of transporta-
tion, are comparatively few. They have all been carefully con-
sidered in two recent cases, to which we would call attention.
These are Gi'swold v. Railway Co. (1885), 53 Conn. 371, and
that of Railway Co. v. McGown (1886), 65 Tex. 643, in which the
precise question before us was raised, and decided, after a careful
examination of the authorities, in a different manner by the high-
est court of Connecticut, and that of Texas. No doubt ex-
isted in either case, in the opinion of the court, that the ticket
of the passage was strictly a gratuity, and it was held by the
former court that, under these circumstances, the carrier and
the passenger might lawfully agree that, the passenger should
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bear the risks of transportation, and that such agreement
would be enforced, while the reverse was held by the court of
Texas. - We are brought to the decision of the question unem-
barrassed by any weight of authority without the common-
wealth that can be considered as preponderating.
It is Urged on behalf of the plaintiff that while the relation
.of passenger and carrier is created by contract, it does not fol-
low that the duty and responsibility of the carrier are depend-
•ent upon the contract; that while, with reference to matters
indifferent to the public, parties may contract according to their
own pleasure, they cannot do so where the public has an in-
terest; that as certain duties are attached by law to certain
,employments, these cannot be waived or dispensed with by
individual contracts; that the duty of the carrier requires that
he should convey his passengers with safety; that he is prop-
erly held responsible in damages if he fails to do so by negli-
gence, whether the negligence is his own or that of his
servants, in order that this safety may be secured to all who
travel. It is also said that the carrier and the passenger do
not stand upon an equality; that the latter cannot stand out
-and higgle or seek redress in courts; that he must take the
alternatives the carrier presents, or practically abandon his
business in the transfer of merchandise, and must yield to the
terms imposed on .him as a passenger; that he ought not to be
induced to run the risks of transportation, for being allowed
to travel at a less fare, or for any similar reason, and thus to
tempt the carrier or his servants to carelessness, which may
affect others as well as himself; and that, in a fey words, pub-
lic policy forbids that contracts should be entered into with
a public carrier by which he shall be exonerated from his full
responsibility. Most of this reasoning can have no applica-
tion to a strictly free passenger, who receives a passage out of
charity or as a gratuity. Certainly the carrier is not likely to
urge upon others the acceptance of free passes, as the success
of his business 'must depend on his receipts. There can be
no difficulty in the adjustment of terms where passes are so-
licited as gratuities. When such passes are granted by such
of the railroad officials as are authorized to issue them, or
.other public carriers, it is in deference largely to the feeling of
QUIMBY V. BOSTON & M. R. CO.
the community in which they are exercising a public employ-
ment. The instances cannot be so numerous that any tempta-
tion will be offered to carelessness in the management of their
trains, or to an increase in their fares, in both of which sub-
jects the public is interested. In such instances one who is
ordinarily a common carrier does not act as such, but is
simply in the position of a gratutious bailee. The definition
of a "common carrier," which is that a person or corporation
pursuing the public employment of carrying goods or passen-
gers for hire, does not apply under such circumstances. The
service which he undertakes to render is one which he is un-
der no obligation to perform, and is outside of his regular
duties. In yielding to the solicitation of the passenger, he
consents, for the time being, to put off his public employment,
and to do that which it does not impose upon him.
The plaintiff was in no way constrained to accept the gra-
tuity of the defendant. It had been yielded to him only on his
own solicitation. When he did, there is no rule of public pol-
icy, we think, that prevented the carrier from prescribing, as
the condition of it, that it should not be compelled, in addition
to carrying the passenger gratuitously, also to be responsible
to him in damages for the negligence of its servants. It is
well known that, with all the care that can be exercised in the
selection of servants for the management of various appli-
ances of a railroad train, accidents will sometimes occur from
momentary carelessness or inattention. It is hardly reasona-
ble that, besides the gift of free transportation, the carrier
should be held responsible for these, when he has made it the
condition of his gift that he should not be. Nor, in holding
that he need not be under these circumstances, is any count-
enance given to the idea that the carrier may contract with a
passenger to convey him for a less price on being exonerated
from responsibility for the negligence of his servants. In such
a case, the carrier would still be acting in the public employ-
ment exercised by him, and should not escape its responsibiIi-
ties, or limit the obligations which it imposes upon him.
In some cases it has been held that while a carrier cannot
limit his liability for gross negligence, which has been defined
as his own personal negligence (or that of the corporation it-
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self, where that is the carrier), he can contract for exemption
from liability for the negligence of his servants. It may be
doubted whether any such distinction in degrees of negligence,
and the right of a carrier to exempt himself from responsibility
therefor, can be profitably made or applied: The New World
v. King (I81), 16 How. (57 U. S.) 469. It is to be observed,
however, that in the case at bar the injury occurred thr6ugh
the negligence of defendant's servants, and not through any
failure on the part of the corporation to prescribe proper rules
or furnish proper appliances of the conduct of its business.
We are of opinion that where one accepts, purely as a
gratuity, a free passage upon a railroad train, upon the agree-
ment that he will assume all risk of accident which may hap-
pen to him, while traveling on such train, by which he may
be injured in his person, no rule of public policy requires us
to declare such contract invalid and without binding force. By
the terms of the report there must therefore be judgment for
defendant.
The question involved in the
principal case, as to the validity of
a contract between a carrier of pas-
sengers and a traveler, by which the
latter, in consideration of a free
pass being granted to him, relieves
the former from all responsibility
for any injury he may sustain, is
one of great importance as affecting
the whole traveling community.
It is much to be regretted that
any conflict of opinion should ex-
ist upon a matter of such vital
interest. There is no doubt how-
ever that the authorities differ, al-
though their weight would seem to
be against the validity of such con-
tracts.
In New York State, where such
contracts are upheld, very strong
dissenting opinions have been de-
livered.
In Welles v. The New York Cen-
tralRR. Co. (1862), 24 N. Y. iSI,
the plaintiff, a gratuitous passenger,
was injured while traveling on a free
pass exempting the company fron
all liability. On the ticket the fol-
lowing words were printed, "The
person accepting this free ticket
assumes all risk of accidents, and
expressly agrees that the company
shall not be liable, under any cir-
cumstances, whether of negligence
of their agents or otherwise, for any
injury to the person, or for any loss
or injury to the property of the
passenger using this ticket." Here
the Court held such contract good,
and the defendants not liable for
the injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff. This view was taken byJustices
GOULD, DENIO, DAvis, ALLEN, and
SMITH, while justice SUTHERLATNA1
delivered a strong dissenting opin-
ion, whereinhe remarks: "After a
careful consideration of this impor-
tant question, I have come to the
conclusion that the contract is il-
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legal and void, and should be held
to be so, as against public policy,
as declared both by the common law,
and statute law. : * It can also be
said that such contracts are void as
against the policy of the law punish-
ing such breaches of the peace as
misdemeanors." After pointing
out the degree of care to be exer-
cised by carriers of passengers, inde-
pendent of fare or other considera-
tion, he proceedsthus: $" Would it
be consistent with the requirements
of the law or its policy, to permit
railroad corporations to make and
enforce contracts with their pas-
sengers tending to promote a re-
laxation of the very care in the
selection of their employes and
otherwise, which is the object of
this requirement of the law to se-
cure? * * All laws punishing
crimes against the person, and
against the public health, show that
the life and health of a citizen is a
matter of public consideration.
That its citizens constitute the
strength and wealth of a State, is
an elementary principle of politi-
cal economy. It certainly cannot
be said thata man has eithera moral
or legal right to speculate with his
own life; or to make any contract
tending to remove the safeguards
which the law places around it. It
is plain to me, from the above gener-
al considerations, that the extra-
ordinary liability of the defendants
in damages for, negligence as car-
riers of passengers, was not declar-
ed by law, nor is it enforced by law,
for the benefit only of the party in-
jured in any particular case; but
it was declared, and is enforced, for
the benefit of the public also; and
therefore, a passenger can not by
contract, in advance of the injury,
lay aside even his individual bene-
fit from the law orrule of liability."
In this view Justice WRIGHT, con-
curred.
Perkins v. The New York en-
tral RR. Co. (i862), 24N. Y. 196,
was also a case of a gratuitous pas-
senger, injured while traveling on a
similar ticket. Here the Court also
held that the endorsement exempted
the company from all kinds of
negligence of its agents, gross as well
as ordinary, and -went so far as to
say that practically, in truth, there
is no distinction in the degrees of
negligence. In his opinion Justice
R. D. SMITH observes : -" They
[the company] were, and are, not
bound to carry him [the passenger]
or any other person gratuitously,
but, undertaking to carry him, they
must do it carefully as with other
passengers." He referred to
Coggs v. Bernard (iqfra) ; Nollon
v. The lVestern RR. Co. (1857), 15
N. Y. 444, and Gellinwater v. The
Madison and Indianafiolis RR. Co.
(1854), 5 Ind. 340, in support of this
contention. In speaking of the
ticket and the notice thereon, he
proceeds: "It ought not to be con-
sidered as applying to such risks as
could not have been within the in-
tent, and contemplation, of the
parties, and cannot apply to such as
ard not within the legitimate com-
pass of contract, upon principles of
public policy." He considered,
however, that there had been an
express contract made, and that the"
passenger became "his own in-
surer," and'had absolved the com-
pany in advance from all liability
"for any injury to his person" from
such negligence. In this opinion
he was supported by Chief Justice
SETDrnN, who drew a distinction
between the negligent acts of the
directors and those of their officers
or agents, saying, "No contract * *
can exempt a railroad company
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from liability for the wilful or
wanton misconduct or gross reck-
lessness of its directors, but the
rule extends to no other officer or
agent of the company." Justices
DENIO, DAVIS, ALLsN, and GOULD,
concurred.
The law as defined in the New
York cases holding such contracts
valid, is followed in New Jersey:
Kinneyetal. Adm'rsv. The Central
RR. Co. of New Jersey (i869), 34
N.J. Law 513, which was a case of
a free pass with an agreement stip-
ulating that, in consideration of the
same, the passenger assumed all
risk of accident, and that the com-
pany should not be liable under
any circumstances. Justice VAw
SvcKEL maintains the validity of
such contracts in the following lan-
guage,-"The objection that this
contract is inconsistent with good
morals and sound policy has been
considered in all the cases of this
kind which have been submitted to
judicial criticism. It differs widely
from the question whether a per-
son should be allowed to stipulate
against a loss from his own neg-
ligence. Reasons of great cogency
could be started against the validity
of such a contract which can have
no pertinency to this issue. * *
Why should the passenger who so-
licits a free pass be permitted to
escape the liability to loss which he
voluntarily assumes in order to
secure the accommodation? It is
certainly a breach of good faith in
the passenger, to attempt to fix the
carrier with responsibility in such a
case."
The same ruling is followed in
Connecticut: Griswold Adm'r v.
The New York and Mew England
RR. Co. (I885), 35 Conn. 371, also
a case of a passenger traveling on a
free pass with a condition exempt-
ing the company from all liability.
The remarks of Justice LoomIs show
that he considered the agreement
as dissolving the position of carrier
and passenger, and creating that
of an ordinary bailor and bailee.
He says,-" In the first place, the
arrangement between the parties
ought not to be regarded as a con-
tract with the railroad company in
its character as a common carrier,
and therefore the stipulated ex-
emption is no abdication of that
rigid responsibility which the law
imposes on common carriers. The
gratuitous accommodation concerns
only the immediate parties, unless
in: a very indirect way, by making
the fare of the other passengers
higher."
Pausing for one moment to con-
sider these remarks, it will be found
that even supposing the relationship
of the parties is changed by such a
contract, and the carrier becomes a
gratuitous bailee, he will still be lia-
ble for any injury sustained through
negligence in himself or his ser-
vants, upon the principle laid
down in the famous case of Coggs
v.- Bernard (1704), 2 Ld. Raym.
909, where it was decided that the
confidence induced by undertaking
any service for "another, is a suffi-
cient consideration to create a duty
in the performance of it, even
though the act be gratuitous.
This is clearly shown by the case
of Todd v. The Old Colony and
Fall River RR. Co. (1861), 3 Allen
(Mass.) iS, where the plaintiff was
a gratuitous passengerlawfully upon
the defendants cars. Chief justice
BIGELOW, saying,-"The defend-
ants having undertaken to trans-
port the plaintiff in their cars, were
bound to the use of due and season-
able care in performing a duty
which theyhad voluntarilyassumed;
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and if, by omitting to take such
15recautions as were necessary and
proper to prevent a person exercis-
ing due care, from receiving an in-
jury, the plaintiff was injured, he is
entitled to recover compensation."
The cases of Fairmount and Arch
Streel Passenger Ry. Co. v. Stutter
(1867), 54 Pa. 375, wherein it was
held that the duty to carry safely,
is a duty the company owe; Wilton
v. M1fiddlesex RR. Co. (1871), 107
Mass. io8, where the plaintiff was
riding on a street car gratuitously
at the driver's invitation; The Ohio
and.,Tfississipfii RR. Co. v. M uhing
(186i), 30 Ill. 9, a case of a work-
man of the company injured while
traveling on the road in pursuit of
his own business, without having
paid any fare, are to the same
effect.
Further, with respect to the
gratuitous accommodation con-
cerning only the immediate parties.
Does the degree of care which is
bound to be exercised by a carrier
of passengers, and especially by a
railroad company, depend upon the
relationship existing between the
carrier and the passenger? It exists
independently of any contract, for,
says the Court, in Moreland v.
Boston and Providence RR. Co.
(1886), 141 Mass. 31, "The degree
of care is not fixed solely by the
relation of carrier and passenger, it
is measured by the consequences
which may follow the want ofcare."
For this reason, therefore, such con-
tracts ought not to be sustained.
So, in Welles v. The New York
Central RR. Co. (1862), 24 N. Y.
181, Justice SUTHBRRLAND, in his
dissenting opinion, points out that
the law requires of carriers of pas-
sengers all the care that human
foresight is capable of, and that the
duty to use this extraordinary care
is a legal duty, independent of any
contract with, or fare or considera-
tion paid by, their passengers, and
that as carriers of passengers as well
as of property, they may be con-
sidered as acting in a public capaci-
ty, and as a kind of public officers.
To the same effect are the words of
Justice JUDrG in Mobile & Ohio
RR. Co. v. Hopkins (1868), 41 Ala.
489; also those of Justice FIErD in
the case of Hannibal & St. Joseph
RR. Co. v. Swift (1871), 12 Wall. (79
U. S.)261, where he says: "They
[the obligations] were imposed up-
on it [the company] by the law,
from the public nature of its employ-
ment, independent ofany contract."
Again, in The Piiladelpihia &
Reading RR. Co. v. Derby (1852),
14 How. (55 U. S.) 486, a case of a
free passenger, one of the Com-
pany's stockholders, who was in-
jured while being taken over the
road to examine its condition,
Justice GPuER says, " the liability
of the defendants below [the com-
pany], for the negligent and injur-
ious act of their servant, is not ne-
cessarily founded on any contract
or privity between the parties, nor
affected by any relation, social or
otherwise, which they bore to each
other. It is true, a traveler by
stage coach, or other public con-
veyance, who is injured by the
negligence of the driver, has an ac-
tion against the owner, founded on
his contract to carry him safely.
But the maxim of resiondeat su-
perior, which, by legal imputation
makes the master liable for the acts
of his servant, is wholly irrespective
of any contract, express or implied,
or any relation between the injured
party and the master * * This duty
[to carry safely] does not result
alone from the consideration paid
for the service. It is imposed by
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the law, even where the service is
gratuitous."
It will be observed that in the
opinion in the New Jersey case
(supra, page 393) it is said that
such a case differs widely from the
question whether a person should
be allowed to stipulate against
loss from his own negligence and that
it would be a breach of good faith to
attempt to fix the carrier with re-
sponsibility in such a case. The
question, however, arises. Hasnot
public policy something to do with
the matter? Has not the State as
parens patriae an interest in the
lives nd limbs of its subjects?
The lives and health of individuals
when traveling by railroad, are en-
tirely in the hands, and at the
mercy, of such companies. The
traveler is powerless and without
any means of helping himself even
if he could or would. He has no
means of knowing whether the road
over which he has to travel is in
proper condition or not, he has no
power to examine the engine and
coaches of the train to satisfy him-
self that they are in full working
order and repair, neither can he
regulate the rate of speed at which
the train shall travel ; it may be
run at an improper speed in order
to make lost time, and accidents may
thereby be occasioned, yet he is
powerless to prevent it and cannot
interfere. Through these and other
means, unmistakably negligence on
the part of the carrier, his agents
and employes, accidents, and it may
be truly said the majority of them,
occur. It is therefore contended
that such companies, as public
servants, ought not to be allow-
ed to contract themselves out of all
liability, and that, on the ground
and on considerations of public
policy, they are properly held liable
even to a gratuitous passenger
traveling upon a free conditional
pass or a special contract, for
negligence in themselves, their
agents and other employes.
This contention is supported by
the dissenting opinions of Justices
SUTHERLAND and WRIGHT, in
Welles v. The New York Central
RR. Co. (supra), also by the opin-
ion of Justice Sm.ITH in Perkins v.
The NVew York Central RR. Co.
(supra), and by the cases hereinafter
mentioned.
A railroad company, as well as
any other carrier of passengers, is
held to a stringent duty and respon-
sibility, and the degree of duty is
obviously to be measured by the
dangers which attend the carriage,
and the control which the carrier
lawfully exercises over both vehicles
and roadway. A carrier of passen-
gers by coach, on a public high-
way, would be accountable for the
negligence of the person whom he
places in charge of the vehicle, and
his own also, if injury occurs from
the unfitness or defectiveness of
such vehicle. A carrier of passen-
gers on a railroad (such road be-
ing operated by the carrier), is re-
sponsible for the negligence of his
agents and employes in charge of
the vehicles, and the railroad also,
and his accountability extends not
only to the conduct and manage-
ment of the railroad, so far as re-
lates to the transit, but also to the
sufficiency of the vehicles and the
roadway itself. When a railroad
company is the- carrier, the duty
rests on such company, not only to
provide safe vehicles, but a safe
roadway; and in view of the dan-
gers which attend railroad carriage,
its duty is not limited to such pre-
cautions as it is apparent, after an
accident, might have prevented the
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injury, but to such as would be
dictated by the utmost care and
prudence of a very cautious person
before the accident, and without
knowledge that it was about to oc-
cur: 5er Justice WRIGHT, in Smith
Adm'r v. The New York Central
_RR. Co. (1862), 24 N. Y. 222.
The responsibility thus cast upon
railroad companies and other car-
rier of passengers, is thrust upon
them out of considerations of pub-
lic policy, for, says the Court in
The Pennsylvania RR. Co. v.
3llarion (1885), 1O4 Ind. 239, a rail-
road company must, "out of con-
siderations of publicpolicy," exer-
cise the highest diligence for the
benefit of the passenger while in
the actual progress of his journey.
So vigilant is the law in this re-
spect, and all on account of public
policy, that it has been held that
railroad companies must employ
the very best possible well-known
means and appliances, to insure the
safety of the public: Pendleton
5treet RR. Co. v. Shiress (1868),
18 Ohio St. 255. And for the same
reasons, they "must keep pace
with science and art, and modern
improvements, in their application
to the carriage of passengers, but
they are not responsible for the un-
known as well as the new :" per
Justice AGNEW in .17eier v. The
Pennsylvania ffR. Co. (I87O), 64
Pa. 225.
Seeing then, that such responsi-
bility does not depend upon con-
tract; that the duty the carrier owes
to his passengers is cast upon him
by law, out of considerations of pub-
lic policy, as a means of public
safety; that he acts in a public
capacity as a public servant; and
that the maxim respondeat suzperior
is independent of any contract; is
it not contrary to public policy, and
the principles which govern the
carrier's duties, to allow such con-
tracts to stand ?
It is true, that persons may enter
into whatever contracts they please,
but to this principle of law there is
a proviso, which says, that in so
doing, they must not violate any
legal or moral obligation, or impair
any public interest, for, if the ten-
dency of such contracts be to im-
pair public interest, they are against
public policy and void: Smith
Adm'r v. The New York Central
RR. Co. (x862), 24 N. Y. 222.
It would seem that the tendency
of such contracts is toward the vio-
lation of both a legal and moral
duty and to impair public interest.
This contention is clearly upheld by
Justice WEILLEs, in Parsons v.
.irontielh (1851), 13 Barb. (N. Y.)
353, in these words:-" A contract
which should excuse a carrier from
his own fraud or gross negligence,
would be contra bonos mores, and
void. So, of contracts for the vio-
lation of any law, common or stat-
ute." See also Sleinweg v. The
Erie Ry. (1870), 43 N. Y. 123.
In Pennsylvania RR. Co. v.
McCloskey's Adm'r (1854), 32 Pa.
526, the same principle is contended
for, the Court saying:-" Assuming
that a public company of carriers
may contract for other exemptions
from liability than those allowed by
law, still such a contract will not,
exempt from liability for gross neg-
ligence."
Such a contract cannot relieve
them from ordinary care in the per-
formance of their duty ; and the
most that it can do, is to relieve
them from those conclusive pre-
sumptions of negligence which
arise when the accident is not ine-
vitable, even by the highest care,
and to require that negligence be
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actually proved against them: Per
LOWR1E, C. J., in Goldey v. The
Pennsylvania RR. Co. (1858), 30
Pa. 242 ; followed in Powell v. The
Pennsylvania RR. Co. (1859), 32
Id. 414; Farnham el al. v. The
Camden & Amboy RR. Co.
(1867), 55 Id. 53; The Amerwcan
Express Co. v. Sands (iS67), Id.
141 ; Empire Transportalion Co.
v. Wamsutta Oil Refining and
3ining Co. (870), 63 Id. 14. The
same rule has been followed in The
Illinois Central RR. Co. v. Mfor-
rison (1857), 19 Ill. 136 (infra);
The Indiana Central RR. Co. v.
Mfundy (1863), 2I Ind. 48 ; Squire v.
The New York Central Ri. Co.
(1867), 98 Mass. 239; Hadley v.
The Northern Transportation Co.
.(1874), I15 Id. 304 ; Welsh v. The
Pittsburg, Port Vayne &' Clhicago
RR. Co. (I859), ioOhio St. 65 ; Un-
ion Express Co. v. Graham (1875),
26 Id. 595 ; Gaines v. The Union
Transportation and Insurance Co.
(1876), 28 Id. 418, wherein Justice
JOHNSON said-" He cannot by such
a stipulation, relieve himself from
responsibility for losses caused by
his own negligence or want of care
or skill, and the burden of proof is
upon the carrier to show not only a
loss within the terms of the ex-
emption, but also that proper care
and skill were exercised to prevent
it."
The same rule is upheld in West
Virginia, The .Baltimore & Ohio
RR. Co. v. Skeels (1869), 3 W.
Va. 556, whereinJustice BERKSHEIRX
states the law as follows : "By ex-
press stipulation in the contract to
that effect, they may, at least,
exonerate themselves from all lia-
bility that does not arise from the
want of ordinary care and diligence
on their part."
This question is perhaps nowhere
betterstated than by Justice BRAD-
LEY, in The New York Central R
R. Co. v. Lockwood (1873) 17 Wall.
(84 U. S.) 367, as follows:. x. That
a common carrier cannot lawfully
stipulate for exemption from re-
sponsibility when such exemption is
not just and reasonable in the eye
of the law. 2 That it is not just
and reasonable in the eye of the law
for a common carrier to stipulate for
exemption from responsibility for
negligence of himself or his ser-
vants. 3. That these rules apply
both to carriers of goods and car-
riers of passengers for hire, and
with special force to the latter.
Special attention should here be
called to this last case, inasmuch as
Justice BRADLEY states that the
Court "purposely abstain from ex-
pressing any opinion as to what
would have been the result of our
judgment had we considered the
plaintiff a free passenger instead of a
passenger for hire." The case was
one of the drover class, and the
Court held that a drover traveling
on a pass, for the purpose of taking
care of his stock on the train, was
a passenger for hire, his passage be-
ing one of the mutual terms of the
arrangement for carrying his cattle.
Although" these cases differ from
those of purely gratuitous passen-
gers, yet a short examination of the
opinion, especially when read with
his opinion in The Grand Trunk
Ry. of Canada v. Slevens (infra
page 402) may be found usdful as
showing that such contracts, in
so far as they seek to relieve
the company from liability for
negligence of itself and its ser-
vants, are contrary to public policy
and void. Mr. Justice BRADLEY'S
language is forcible, and it is sub-
mitted that when read as before in-
dicated, might equally apply to the
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case of a free passenger: "Conced-
ing * * that special contracts,
made by common carriers with their
customers, limiting their liability,
are good and valid so far as they
are just and reasonable; to the ex-
tent, for example, of excusingthem
from all losses happening by acci-
dent, without any negligence or
fraud on their part; when they ask
to go still further, and tobe excused
for negligence, an excuse so repug-
nant to the law of their foundation
and to the public good, they have
no longer any plea of justice or
reason to support such a stipulation,
but the contrary." Pioceeding, he
remarks, "Is it true that the public
interest is not affected by indivi-
dual contracts of the kind referred
to? Is not the whole business com-
munity affected by holding such
contracts valid? If held valid, the
advantageous position of the com-
panies exercising the business of
common carriers is such that it
places it in their power to change
the law of common carriers in ef-
fect, .by introducing new rules of
obligation." The Court came to
the conclusion that a common car-
rier cannot lawfully stipulate for
exemption from responsibility when
such exemption is nbt just and
reasonable in the eye of the law.
The same is the ruling of the
Court in the case of Thze Illinois Cen-
tral RR. Co. v. Morrison (1857), 19
Ill. 136, wherein it was held that a
railroad company cannot excuse it-
self from liability for gross negli-
gence or wilful misfeasance, against
which good morals and public
policy forbid that they should be
permitted to stipulate.
In Mobile 6 Ohio RR.v. Hop-
kins (i868), 41 Ala. 489, a case of a
free pass in consideration of the
passenger assuming all responsi-
bility, Justice JUDGE, refutes th6
declaration made by Justice Loomis
in the New Jersey case (supra) to
the effect that the contract was not
made with the company in its cap-
acity of a carrier of passengers, and
expresses himself thus: "The re-
lation of common carrier and pas-
senger certainly subsists between
the parties, notwithstanding the
contract. * * In undertaking the
performance of gratuitous transpor-
tation, the common carrier can no
more stipulate for exemption from
liability for damages occasioned by
the negligence or wilful default, or
tort, of himself or his servants, than
he can when he receives a reward
for the services to be performed;
both are alike prohibited by a sound
public policy, which also forbids
a gratuitous bailee, not bound by
the considerations of pubIic duty
attached to the office of a common
carrier, from stipulating that he
may be fraudulently negligent or
safely dishonest. Railroad com-
panies are incorporated, in part at
least, from public considerations,
and for the public good. * * * The
exercise of honesty, care and dili-
gence, by them or their agents and
employes, is a public duly resulting
from their position, the obligation
to perform which cannot be thrown
off by contract. If thus thrown off,
the effect would be to relax, or
modify, the performance of the
duty, and to promote a relaxation
of proper care in the selection of
agents and servants for its perform-
ance." He further adds, "A com-
mon carrier cannot exempt himself,
by any such contract, from liability
for the negligence, wilful default,
or tort, of himself or his servants,
and upon this familiar principle,
that whatever has an obvious tend-
ency to encourage guilty negli-
gence, fraud, or crime, is contrary
to public policy."
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The case of The Pennsvlvania
RR. Co. v. Buller(x868), 57 Pa. 335,
was also one of the same class,
Justice SHkRSWOOD, stating-" It
is too well settled to be controverted
that a stipulation by a common
carrier that he shall not be liable
for damages, does not relieve him
from responsibility for actual neg-
ligence by himself or his servants."
In Knowltoi' v. The Erie Ry. Co.
(x869), i9 Ohio St. 260, the Court
held that the company were not
liable, as the contract was made
within the jurisdiction of the laws
of New York, and was to be decid-
ed according to the law of that State,
pursuant to the well-known rule,
that contracts must be construed
according to the law of the country
where they are made, and in which
they are to be performed; and on
no other principle, as is clearly
shown by the remarks of justice
SCOTT, which prove the law to be
the reverse in Ohio: "It has been
repeatedly held by this Court, that
a common carrier cannot, in this
State, even by express contract,
relieve himself from liability for
injuries caused by his own negli-
gence, or that of his servants in the
discharge of the duties of his em-
ployment."
The case of Jacobus v. The St.
Paul& Chicago Ry. Co. (1873),
30 Miun. 125, wasalso one in which
the plaintiff held a free conditional
pass, which the Court decided did
not relieve the company from re-
sponsibility, Justice BSRRY, in de-
livering a very strong opinion,
saying, "There are two distinct
considerations upon which the
stringent rule as to the duty and
liability of carriers of passengers
rests. One is, the regard for the
safety of the passenger on his own
account, and the other is, a regard
for his safety as a citizen of the
'State. The latter is a consideration
of public policy, growing out of the
interest which the State or govern-
ment as parens palriae has in
protecting the lives and limbs of
its subjects. * * So far as .the
consideration of public policy is
concerned, it cannot be overridden
by any stipulation of the parties to
the contract of passenger carriage,
since it is paramount from its na-
ture. No stipulation oftheparties,
in disregard of it or involving its
sacrifice in any degree can then be
permitted to stand. Whether the
case be one of a passenger for hire
-a merely gratuitous passenger-
or a passenger upon a conditional
free pass, as in this instance-the
interest of the State in the safety
of the citizen is obviously the same.
The more stringent the rule, as to
the duty and liability of the carrier,
and the more rigidly enforced, the
greater will be the care exercised,
and the more approx.imately perfect
the safety of the passenger. Any
relaxation of the rule as to duty or
liability naturally, and it may be
said inevitably, tends to bring
about a corresponding relaxation of
care and diligence. We can con-
ceive of no reason why these
propositions are not equally appli-
cable to passengers of either of the
kinds above mentioned."
These principles are further sup-
ported by the decision of the Iowa
Court in Rose v. Des ildoines Valley
R R. Co. (1874), 39 Iowa 246, an-
other case of a passenger with afree
conditional ticket; wherein Chief
Justice MILLRE expressed himself
as follows: "The weight of Amer-
ican authority is, that a common
carrier cannot by notice or special
contract, restrict, limit or avoid its
common law liability for negli-
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gence." And after reviewing the
authorities pro and con., the learn-,
ed Judge proceeded: " In our opin-
ion the better doctrine is that an-
nounced in Philadelphia and Read-
ing RR. Co. v. Derby (intfra), and
the-cases in accord therewith. Be-
sides, and independently of the ad-
judicated cases, upon the broad and
unqualified provisions of our stat-
utes * * we are of opinion that a
common carrier by railroad, wheth-
er gratuitous or for the usual or
other charges or compensation,
is liable for injuries sustained in
consequence of the negligence of
its employes engaged in the work
of operating the road."
The statute referred to in the
above opinion (Revised Stat. Iowa
p. 455 ed. 1888) provides, "SE c 1307.
E very corporation operating a rail-
way shall be liable for all damages
sustained, by any person, including
the employes of such corporation,
in consequence of the neglect of
agents, or by any mismanagement
of the engineers, or other employes
of the corporation, and in conse-
quence of the wilful wrongs,
whether of commission or omission
of such agents, engineers, or other
employes, where such wrongs are
in any manner connected with
the use and operation of any rail-
way, on or about which they shall
be employed, and no contractwhich
restricts such liability shallbe legal
or binding."
The language of Justice GREMR in
The Plkiladelphia& Reading RR.
Co. v. Derby (supra) is as follows:
'" When carriers undertake to con-
vey persons by -the powerful, but
dangerous agency of steam, public
policy and safety require, that they
be held to the greatest possible care
and diligence, and whether the con-
sideration for such transportation
be pecuniary or otherwise, the
personal safety of the passengers
should not be left to the sport of
chance, or the negligence of care-
less agents. * * Any relaxation of
the stringent policy and principles
of the law would be highly detri-
mental to public safety."
These principles were further up-
held by the case of The New World
v. King (1853) 16 How. (57 U. S.)
469, a case of a free passenger car-
ried on a steamboat injured by
the explosion of the boiler; here
Justice CURTIS, -after citing the
language of Justice GRIER, sufira,
remarks, "We desire to be under-
stood to reaffirm that doctrine, as
resting, not only on public policy,
but on sound principles of law."
The more recent cases also sup-
port this doctrine. In W~aterbury
v. The New York Central & H.
R. RR. Co. (1883), (Cir. Ct. N. D.
N. Y.), 17 ]Fed. Repr. 671, Justice
WAI.A CE says, "When the assent
to his [the passenger's] riding free
has been legally and properly
given, the person carried is entitled
to the same degree of care as if he
had paid his fare."
The case of Files v. Boston and
Albany RR. Co. (1889), 149
Mass. 204, where the plaintiff was
injured while riding on a freight
train, further shows that the re-
sponsibility of a carrier of passen-
gers does not depend upon any
pecuniary compensation, Justice
Divmzs saying, "if the defendant
had permitted the plaintiff to ac-
quire the rights of a passenger, it
would not be important that he was
not to pay any fare." The same
doctrine has been upheld in Mary-
land: State ex. rel. Abell v. The
Westeryt Maryland RR. Co. (I885),
63 Md. 433.
In Wisconsin, it has been held
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that a carrier may, in cases of grat-
uitous contracts, exempt himself
from liability other than gross neg-
ligence: Anna's Adm'r etc., v.
The Milwaukee &" Northern RR.
Co. (i886), 67 Wis. 46, thus follow-
ing the rule laid down in the major-
ity of the cases. To the same ef-
fect is the law in Indiana: Thayer
v. St. Louis, Alton & Terre
-fHaute Ry. Co. (1864), 22 Ind. 26;
and of Illinois, Illinois CentraIRR.
Co. v. Read (1865), 37 Ill. 484.
The Constitution of Nebraska of
2875, Art. II, provides-" Section
4. The liability of railroad corpora-
tions as common carriers shall
never be limited;" under this
Article, the Supreme Court of that
State, in Missouri Pacific RR. Co.
v. Vanderventer, decided (March
2 , 1889), that the company could
not limit its liability by a special
contract.
A very strong opinion against the
validity of such contracts was de-
livered in G. C. & S. F. Ry. Co.
-v. AcGowz (1886), 65 Texas 640
(also a conditional free pass case),
by Associate Justice STAYTON, as
follows: "Treating the pass as
the evidence of a contract between
the parties, and giving to it the
most favorable construction for the
appellant [the company], the ques-
tion in the case broadly stated, is,
can a public carrier of passengers
so contract as to relieve itself from
liability for an injury to a passen-
ger from the negligence of the car-
rier or its servants? That there are
many cases which hold that a pub-
lic carrier of passengers may so
limit its liability, cannot be ques-
tioned. * * W e are of opinion
that the distinction sought to be
made in the New York and New
Jersey cases * * has no solid
foundation in reason or in public
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policy, when considered with ref-
erence to the right of a corporation,
pursuing the business of a common
carrier, to limit, by contract, its
liability to a passenger for injury
resulting from the negligence of any
class of its agents! * * The ques-
tion whether a railroad company-
a public carrier of passengers-can
relieve itself from liability, even to
a free passenger, for an injury
which results from the negligence
of any of its employes or agents of
whatever grade, has not been de-
cided in this State, but it arises in
this case. It seems to us upon
principle, that it must be held that
such a carrier cannot relieve itself,
by contract, from responsibility for
injury that results from negligence,
such as will fix liability upon the
carrier under the general rules ap-
plicable to the ordinary relation of
carrier and passenger. That the
fact that the liability of the carrier
does not depend on the fact that
compensation for the passage is
paid to the carrier, is well settled.
* * The relation of passenger and
carrier is created by contract, ex-
press or implied, but it does not fol-
low from this that the extent of
liability or responsibility of the
carrier is, in any respect, depen-
dent on a contract. In reference to
matters indifferent to the public,
parties may contract as they please,
but not so in reference to matters
in which the public has an interest.
For the purpose of regulating such
matters, rules have been establish-
ed, by statute, or the common law,
whereby certain duties have been
attached to given relations and em-
ployments. These duties attach as
matters of law, and without regard
to the will or wish of the party en-
gaged in the employment, or of the
person who transacts business with
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him, in the course thereof; and this
is so, for the public good. Duties
thus imposed, are not the subject
of contract. They exist without it,
and cannot be dispensed with by it.
The violation of such a duty is a
tort. The law 'declares that it is
the duty of a public carrier of pas-
sengers to use the highest degree of
care, to insure safety. Why was
not this left to be settled by the
contract of the carrier and passen-
ger? Certainly for no other reason
than that the employment itself
was of such a nature as to make it
a matter of public concern. None
could be of greater public concern,
at the present day, than these em-
ployments by which men, women
and children are transported by
millions, by agencies of a most
dangerous character and with a
speed heretofore unknown. The
rule * * is demanded by the na-
ture of the employment, and em-
braces a policy which no State,
having a due regard for the safety
and lives of its people, can abandon;
for it discourages negligence, by
holding the carrier to strict re-
sponsibility, and imposes upon him
no responsibility which he does not
voluntarily assume when he en-
gages in such employment. It is
simple, and discards all fine dis-
criminations in regard to degrees
of negligence, and grades of agents,
in determining liability and right
to recover actual damages."
The theory declared in this opin-
ion fully sustains the doctrin6 set
forth in the majority of the cases
previously noticed in this annota-
tion, and also in the dissenting
opinions in the New York cases
(upfira, p 391), and would seem to be
the better law.
In its opinion in the case of Flinn
v. The Pliladelphia, Wilmington
&_ Baltimore RR. Co. (1866), r
Houst. (Del.) 469, a case ofa drover's
pass with a condition attached, the
Court expressed itself thus : "It was
inconsistent with the relation in.
which they [the company] stood to
him [the plaintiff] or would have
stood to any similar passenger under
like circumstances, and utterly at
variance with the duty which the
law, on the ground ofpublic policy,
as well as the conservator of the
lives and the personal safety, as
well as thc property of individuals,
imposes upon them, as well as upon
other classes of common carriers of
persons, to allow of such an ex-
emption or limitation of their re-
sponsibilities, for the personal
safety of their passengers, against
injuries resulting from their own
negligence, or the want of due care
and diligence in carrying them."
Reference may with advantage,
be made to the case of The Grand
Trunk Railway 01 Canada v. Stevens
(I878) 95 U. S. 655. It was asome-
what peculiar one and came as near
being one of a gratuitous carriage
upon condition as any could doG
without being actually so, the re-
spondent, the owner of a patented
car coupling while negotiating
with the appelant for its adoption
and use, at its request went to,
Montreal. to see the superin-
tendent of the company, the com-
pany giving him a free pass upon
the back of which was indorsdd a.
notice exempting the company from.
all risk of accident under any cir-
cumstances. In delivering the
opinion of the Court, which was
to the effect that the contract was
for hire, and not purely gratuitous,
inasmuch as the mutual interest of
the parties was concerned, and that
the company was therefore liable,
Justice BRADrIW, says, "We do
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not mean to imply, however, that
we should have come to a different
conclusion, had the plaintiff, been
a free passenger instead of a pas-
senger for hire. We are aware
that respectable tribunals have as-
serted the right to stipulate for ex-
emption in such a case; and it is
often asked, with apparent confi-
dence, 'May not men make their
-own contracts, or in other words,
may not a man do what he likes
-with his own?' The question at
first sight seems a simple one. But
there is a question lying behind
that: 'Can a man call that abso-
lutely his own, which he holds as a
great public trust, by the public
grant, and for the public use as well
as his own profit?' The business
of a common carrier, in this coun-
try at least, is emphatically a branch
of the public service."
In a very elaborate opinion in
the case of The Pennsylvania Rail-
road Co. v. Henderson (I865), 51
Pa. 315, which was also a case of
a drover's conditional pass, Mr.
Justice READ reviewed the previous
decisions upon the question, and
commented upon the New York
and New Jersey decisions treating
the dissenting opinions in the
former as the better law, although
delivered by the minority. Speak-
ing of the condition attached to the
pass in the case then before him he
remarks: "This endorsement re-
liees the company from allrespon-
sibility from any cause whatever,
for any loss or injury to the person
or property, however it may have
been occasioned; and our doctrine
settled by the above decisions,
mad upon grave deliberation, de-
clares that such a release is no ex-
cuse for negligence."
The decision in Bissell v. The
_New York Central RR. Co. (1862),
25 N. Y. 442, another case of this
class, supported the contract as
valid. The opinion, however, was
not that of an unanimous Court, for
Chief Justice DEN O, and Justices
WRIGHT and SUTHERLAND dis-
sented therefrom.'
Other cases of the drover's class
might be mentioned, but as they
would not throw further light upon
the question of public policy, and
as the Courts have drawn a distinc-
tion between such passes, and those
issued to a purely gratuitous pas-
senger, it is not proposed to exam-
ine them in this annotation, which
has, as far as possible, been con-
fined to cases of contracts with
gratuitous passengers, as originally
intended. If, however, the line
has, in any way been departed from,
it has only been for the purpose of
elucidating the subject as fully as
possible.
The Constitution of the State of
Pennsylvania provides (Art. XVII,
Section 8): "No railroad, railway,
or other transportation company
shall grant free passes, or passes at
a discount, to any person, except
officers or employes of the com-
pany." A similar clause is not to
be found however in any of the
other State Constitutions.
The remarks of Justice WRIGHT in
Smith Adm'rv. TleNew York Cen-
tral RR. Co.(sitpra, page 396), must
not be lost sight of. He contends
that such contracts are against pub-
lic policy ; that the State is inter-
ested not only in the welfare, but
in the safety, of its citizens; that
the question affects the public and
not merely the party who is being
carried. He insists that the pas-
senger has no right to absolve a
railroad company to whom he com-
mits his person, from the discharge
of these duties imposed upon it for
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the safety of man; that such con-
tracts encourage negligence and
fraud; take away the motive of
self-interest on the part of such
carrier, which is perhaps the only
one adequate to secure the highest
degree of caution and vigilance;
and holds that a contract which has
these tendencies is contrary to pub-
lic policy even when no fare is
paid.
The penal side of the question
must not be forgotten, for where
the defendant's acts are made penal
by statute none of the conditions
printed upon the back of the ticket
can have the effect to relieve it from
its liability for gross negligence and
carelessness. The case of Corn-
imonwealilt v. Vermont and .Al as-
saclusells R.R. Co. (1871), IO8
Mass. 7, illustrates this principle.
It was an action brought against
the company, under a penal statute,
to recover a fine for the use of the
widow and children of the deceased,
killed while a passenger on the de-
fendant's road, through the negli-
gence of the company, its servants
or agents. The deceased was in the
habit of traveling upon defendant's
road, selling corn to the passengers
in the trains, under a contract with
the company. He had a season
ticket upon which was endorsed a
condition exempting the company
from liability for personal injuries
received by the passenger while
traveling on such ticket. The
Court held that none of the condi-
tions had the effect to relieve the
defendants from liability.
In conclusion, the reader's atten-
tion is called to the remarks of Jus-
tice SwANzm in The Indianalolis
-and St. Louis RR. Co. v. Horst
(1876), 93 U. S. 291, a case in which
a drover was injured while obeying
the conductor's instruction in get-
ting from a caboose, in which he
had been traveling, tothe top of an
adjoining car. Hesays, "The pas-
senger has no authority upon either,
[i. e. upon either a passenger or a
freight train] except as to the per-
sonal care of himself. The con-
ductor is the animating and con-
trolling spirit of the mechanism
employed. The public have no,
choice but to use it. The standard
of duty should be according to the
consequences that may ensue from
carelessness. The rule of law has
its foundation in public policy. It
is approved by experience, and
sanctioned by the plainest princi-
ples of reason and justice. It is of
great importance that courts ofj us-
tice should not relax it." -
The question of Statutory Liabil-
ity for causing death will be found.
fully treated upon in THE AMiERI-
C.A. LAw REmGISTER, vol. xxviii,
pages 385, 513, 577, to which the
learned reader is referred.
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